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NEGLIGENT DELAY AND THE SYMPATHETIC DEFENDANT-
Doggett DEFINES NEW PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE
Doggett v. United States
112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992)
Robert W Mueller
I. INTRODUCTION
A person accused of a crime is guaranteed a speedy public trial under the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.' This Note examines the criminal
defendant's speedy trial right. The right to a speedy trial is triggered by a formal
accusation of arrest, indictment, or information.2 When a court inquires into an
alleged violation of this right, a balancing test is employed to determine whether
that violation is sufficient to entitle the defendant to relief.3 Under the Speedy Trial
Clause, the only available remedy is dismissal of the indictment and setting the
criminal defendant free, regardless of guilt.4
The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court to protect criminal defendants from undue delay in prosecutionfol-
lowing formal accusation by indictment or arrest.' To determine whether an ac-
cused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, the Supreme Court has developed
and employed a universal balancing test.6 In United States v. Dogget,' the Supreme
Court ignored its precedent and its balancing test, possibly causing immeasurable
harm. In the Court's attempt to do the right thing for Mr. Doggett, the Court sent a
message to the lower courts to weigh all delay against the government. This result
unfortunately leaves lower courts with no alternative but to dismiss the indict-
ments against accused persons and set them free, regardless of guilt.8
11. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The petitioner, Mark Doggett, was indicted February 22, 1980, on federal drug
charges for conspiring to import and distribute cocaine in violation of §§ 406 and
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971).
3. Barkerv. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,530 (1972). The Court found four factors to be balanced on acase by case
basis: length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id.
4. Id. at 522. See also FED. R. CaM. P. 48(b).
5. Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 ("[It is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy
trial provision of the Sixth Amendment."). But see id. at 322-25 (Protection from pre-accusatory delay is secured
by the Due Process Clause and any applicable statute of limitation.).
6. See generally Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
7. 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992).
8. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
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1013 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act of 1970.' The
Drug Enforcement Administration's [hereinafter DEA] agent Douglas Driver was
to oversee the arrest of Doggett and his accomplices, but when officers, under the
direction of Driver, attempted to apprehend Doggett on March 18, 1980, they
found that he had left days earlier for Colombia.10
The DEA sent the outstanding warrant against Doggett to all United States
Customs Stations and other law enforcement agencies in an attempt to apprehend
Doggett upon his return to this country."1 Doggett's name was also placed in sev-
eral computer networks including the Treasury Enforcement Communication Sys-
tem [hereinafter TECS] and the National Crime Information Center system. 12 The
TECS entry, which enables Customs officials to screen people entering the United
States, expired and was deleted from the system in September of 1980.13
Driver discovered Doggett had been arrested and imprisoned in Panama on
drug charges in September of 1981.14 In Driver's opinion, a formal extradition re-
quest for Doggett would have been to no avail, thus, Driver requested that Doggett
be expelled back to the United States.' 5 Although the government of Panama
agreed to the expulsion of Doggett, they instead freed him in July of 1982, which
enabled him to go to Colombia. 6 The American Embassy in Panama informed the
United States State Department of Doggett's departure from Panama to Colombia,
but the information was never forwarded to Driver.17 Driver never checked into
Doggett's status in Panama until being assigned there in 1985, at which time he
learned of Doggett's move to Colombia. 8 Driver assumed that Doggett had settled
in Colombia, and, thus, made no effort to locate him, either in Colombia or the
United States.19
Doggett reentered the United States in September of 1982.20 He settled in
Virginia and has since married, earned a college degree, and found employment
as a computer operations manager, all while living under his own name.2' In 1988,
the Marshal Service ran a simple credit check on outstanding arrest warrants and
turned up Doggett's name and address.22 On September 5, 1988, Doggett was ar-
rested on federal drug charges stemming from an eight and one-half year old in-
dictment, six years after his return to the United States. 3
9. Doggen, 112 S. Ct. at 2689; 42 U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1977).












22. Id. at 2689-90.
23. Id. at 2690.
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At trial, Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the delay in
prosecuting the charge "violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial."24
The federal magistrate hearing the motion applied the four-part balancing test set
out in Barker v. Wingo2" and found the delay to be "presumptively prejudicial" and
the result of the government's negligence.26 The magistrate also found no evidence
tending to show Doggett knew about the indictment until his arrest, thus, Doggett
could not be held responsible for not asserting his Sixth Amendment rights ear-
lier.27 Because Doggett failed to provide evidence to show the delay in prosecuting
the charges impaired his ability to adequately defend himself or otherwise show
prejudice, the magistrate recommended that the district court deny Doggett's mo-
tion.28 The district court, acting on the magistrate's recommendation, denied
Doggett's motion, at which time Doggett entered a conditional plea of guilty under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure I1 (a)(2) reserving the right to appeal his
Sixth Amendment claim.29
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's rul-
ing in a split decision by applying the Barker test.30 The court stated that Doggett
had not proved actual prejudice, and the government's delay in prosecuting Dog-
gett was negligent, but not in bad faith.31
III. HISTORY AND LAW
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].32
Although the amendment was ratified December 15, 179 1, the judicial history
of the "Speedy Trial Clause" in the Supreme Court of the United States is relatively
brief.
In 1972, the Court adopted its present method for ascertaining a speedy trial
violation in Barker v. Wingo. 34 The Court examined the then-existing fixed-time
24. Id.
25. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).





31. Id. See also United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573 (11 th Cir. 1990).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. See Amend. 6 U.S. C.A. § 6 (note) (1987) (Historical Notes).
34. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,529 (1972).
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period"5 and demand waiver rule36 approaches for determining deprivation of the
defendant's speedy trial rights. 7 The Court rejected both approaches as "inflexi-
ble": The fixed-time period because it goes beyond the requirements of the
Constitution and the demand-waiver rule because it was regarded as too harsh to
require the defendant to demand the State try him within a reasonable time when
the Supreme Court has deemed that right fundamental."
Defendant Barker and his accomplice, Manning, were arrested for the murder
of an elderly couple." Manning was brought to trial first because the prosecution
believed his testimony was required to convict Barker." ° The prosecution required
six trials to finally convict Manning for the killings.41 Barker's trial was set to
begin October 21, 1958, but a series of sixteen continuances delayed the trial to
October 9, 1963- nearly five years later.42 At trial, Barker moved to dismiss the
indictment, asserting that the Commonwealth had violated his right to a speedy
trial."3 The trial court denied the motion, completed the trial, and convicted
Barker." The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
denial of Barker's petition for habeas corpus, ruling that Barker had waived his
claim to a speedy trial by not making a demand for trial.'"
The Supreme Court opted to develop and apply a balancing test to examine
speedy trial allegations on a case by case basis.4" The Court held that each case
involving an issue of denial of speedy trial rights should examine four factors:
"Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant. " "
The triggering mechanism for determining whether an inquiry into the balanc-
ing test is necessary is the length of delay.' "Until there is some delay which is
35. Id. at 523.
36. Id. at 523-25.
37. Id. at 529.
38. Id. at 529-30. The Court refused to establish a specified time in which to offer the defendant a trial. Id. at
523. "We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified
number of days or months." Id. The states were left free to establish such limits consistent with constitutional
standards. Id. The demand waiver rule was rejected as a singular means of determining whether speedy trial
rights have been denied. Id. at 528. Instead, the Court believed that the defendant's demand for a speedy trial
should only be one of the factors to be considered in an inquiry into denial of one's speedy trial right. Id. See also
infra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
39. Barker, 407 U.S. at 516.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 516-17.
42. Id. at 516-18.
43. Id. at 518. Barker did not file an objection to the Commonwealth's continuation motions until February
12, 1962, responding to the twelfth continuance motion. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. See also Barker v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971). In February of 1970, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky rejected Barker's petition for habeas corpus, but granted leave
to appeal in forna pauperis and a certificate of probable cause to appeal. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 518
(1972).
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presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors
that go into the balance .49 However, the "peculiar circumstances of the case" must
also be considered in whether the length of delay will trigger the inquiry."0
The second factor, the reason for delay, is closely related to the length of delay. s
The Court assigned different weights to the government's purported justification
for the delay in prosecution.5" Although delay due to a "neutral" reason such as
negligence is weighed less heavily than intentional delay, the Court held that the
53government is responsible for those circumstances.
The defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial was the third factor which
the Court considered. ' The assertion of the right was given strong evidentiary
weight.55 Conversely, the Court emphasized that a "failure to assert the right will
make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial."56
Prejudice to the defendant, the fourth factor, examined the interests of the de-
fendant in relation to the interests the speedy trial right was designed to protect. 7
"This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired."58 Of these interests, the
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 530-31.
51. Id. at 531.
52. Id. at 531. Deliberate attempts by the government to delay prosecution are weighed heavily against the
State. Id. A neutral reason such as overcrowding of the courts is weighed less heavily. Id. Missing witnesses and
other "valid" reasons justify delay by the State. Id.
53. Id. See also United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338, 1342 (1 1th Cir. 1988) ("[Bly the government's own
admission, at least half of the delay was caused by pure negligence. Thus, we must determine whether a negligent
delay causing minor prejudice to the appellant's defense violates the appellant's due process rights."); United
States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("The best that can be said is that if the government was at
fault for not locating Bagga in India, it was clearly no more than mere negligence [which] . . . 'does not necessar-
ily tip the scale in favor of the defendant, particularly where the defendant was at liberty and outside the jurisdic-
tion where the indictment was returned.' "(citations omitted)); Payne v. Rees, 738 F.2d 118, 123 (6th Cir. 1984)
("There was no deliberate effort by the prosecution in this case to delay the trial, rather there was a negligent
failure to proceed. Under all of these circumstances, . . . there was no proven speedy trial violation, taking into
account all the Barker factors despite the extraordinary delay here involved."); Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 374
(6th Cir. 1982) ("Delay caused by negligence should be weighed against the state, but less heavily than a deliber-
ate attempt to delay trial. . . . The failure of the government to expedite a case which has been pending for a
presumptively prejudicial period of time is treated in a similar fashion." (citations omitted)); United States v.
Carter, 603 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Though a purposeful attempt to delay the trial to prejudice the defendant
. . . should weigh heavily against the Government. . . a more neutral reason, such as negligence, does not nec-
essarily tip the scale in favor of the defendant, particularly where the defendant was at liberty and outside the
jurisdiction where the indictment was returned." (citations omitted)).
54. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1972).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 532.
57. Id.
58. Id. See also Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120
(1966).
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Court determined the third to be the most serious "because the inability of a de-
fendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system." 9
A. Constitutional Considerations
1. Pre-Accusatory Delay
The criminal defendant has two safeguards protecting his liberty interest prior
to formal arrest or indictment, a statute of limitations, if applicable, and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 60 The
Supreme Court of the United States, however, determined such alleged pre-
accusatory delay inapplicable in an examination of the criminal defendant's claims
of a speedy trial violation.6
In 1971, the Court in United States v. Marion62 examined whether the reach of
the Speedy Trial Clause should be extended to include pre-accusation delay.63 The
defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment "for failure to commence prosecution
of alleged offenses charged . . . within such time as to afford [defendants their]
rights to due process of law and to a speedy trial under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States" was filed May 5, 1970.64
The defendants alleged that the indictment against them was returned "an unrea-
sonably oppressive and unjustifiable time after the alleged offense," the charges
required recollection of specific incidents occurring years before, and the delay
was due to the negligence of the United States Attorney's investigation and presen-
tation of the facts to the grand jury.6 The district court dismissed the indictment
"for lack of speedy prosecution" citing that the defense was "bound to have been
seriously prejudiced by the delay ... ."66
The Supreme Court held pre-accusation delay did not violate the Sixth
Amendment's speedy trial right because the applicable state's statutes of limitation
would protect the defendants from any prejudice arising from such a delay.67 The
indictment transformed the appellees into "accused" defendants and secured for
them the protection of the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial.68 "[T]he Sixth
59. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Prejudice due to the death or disappearance of witnesses is obvious, but the
passage of time can also prejudice the defendant by witnesses being unable to recall the events of the past. Id. Cf
Ringstaffv. Howard, 885 F.2d 1542, 1545 (1 th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he three Barker factors must indeed weigh heav-
ily against the Government before prejudice should be presumed.").
60. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1971); U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
61. Marion, 404 U.S. at 323.
62. Id. at 307.
63. Id. at 320-21.
64. Id. at 309. Appellees, operating a business known as Allied Enterprises, Inc., were indicted and charged,
on April 21, 1970, with 19 counts of fraudulently conducting business. Id. at 308-09. The indictments, handed
down in April of 1970, from the grand jury empaneled in September of 1969, were for a period of activity be-
tween March 15, 1965, and February 6, 1967. Id. at 309. The appellees were not informed of the grand jury's
interest in their activities until March of 1970. Id.
65. Id. at 310.
66. Id. See also id. at 310n. 1.
67. Id. at 323.
68. Id. at 325.
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Amendment speedy trial provision ha[d] no application until the putative defend-
ant in some way [became] an 'accused,' an event that occurred. . . only when the
appellees were indicted ... ."69 The Court specifically refused to extend cover-
age of the Sixth Amendment to the pre-arrest period.7" "Until [indictment, infor-
mation, or other formal charge] occurs, a citizen [has] suffer[ed] no restraint[] on
his liberty and [has] not [been] the subject of public accusation: his situation d[id]
not compare with that of a defendant who ha[d] been arrested and held to an-
swer."
71
The Court also found the appellees failed to demonstrate how the government's
pre-accusatory delay violated the defendants' rights under the Due Process
Clause. 72 The "[e]vents of the trial may demonstrate actual prejudice, but at the
"173present time appellee's due process claims are speculative and premature.
Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, stated, "I assume that if the three-
year delay in this case had occurred after the indictment had been returned, the
right to a speedy trial would have been impaired and the indictment would have
been dismissed." 74 Justice Douglas, however, also took into consideration the
changing society:
If we applied the simpler rule that was applied in simpler days,[7 1] we would be giv-
ing extraordinary advantages to organized crime as well as others who use a farflung
complicated network to perform their illegal activities. I think a three-year delay
even in that kind of case goes to the edge of a permissible delay.76
2. Post-Accusatory Delay
a. Pre-Barker Balancing Test
In 1905, the Court, in Beavers v. Haubert,77 analyzed the character of the de-
fendant's right to speedy trial.78 The Court recognized the right to speedy trial as
necessarily relative, consistent with delays, and dependent upon individual cir-
cumstances to protect the rights of a defendant while not ignoring the rights of pub-
lic justice.79 The Barker Court employed this rationale to reject the existing rigid
69.Id. at 313.
70. ld. at 321.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 325.
73. Id. at 326.
74. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 326 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
75. Justice Douglas refers to the English common law of the 18th and 19th Centuries. See id. at 328-29.
76. Id. at 335.
77. 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
78. Id. at 86. The defendant was indicted on three separate charges. Id. at 78. Upon direction of the circuit
court, the defendant surrendered himself to the U.S. Marshal and then posted bond in an appearance before the
district court for the eastern district. id. The district attorney refused to proceed on the indictments because he
intended to remove the case to the District of Columbia, where other indictments were pending against the de-
fendant. Id. at 79. The case was continued and the defendant was arrested on the District of Columbia charge. Id.
79. Id. at 87.
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speedy trial approaches of fixed-time period and demand-waiver rule and to es-
tablish its case by case approach.80
The Supreme Court, in the 1966 case of United States v. Ewell, 81 considered the
adverse effect that the violation of speedy trial rights would have on the criminal
defendant.82 The appellees appealed their conviction alleging that their rearrest
and reindictment, immediately following the court vacating a previous conviction
on the grounds of a defective indictment, violated their speedy trial rights.83 The
Supreme Court explained the rights and privileges that the Speedy Trial Clause of
the Sixth Amendment was designed to protect: "This guarantee is an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize
anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities
that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself."' The Court
recognized that the procedural maneuvering offered to the accused requires the
criminal prosecution to move at a deliberate pace, and any requirement of "unrea-
sonable speed" to prosecute would adversely affect both the accused and society."8
The Court explained it has consistently held that the right to a speedy trial is neces-
sarily relative and dependent upon delays and circumstances."
In analyzing the delays and circumstances, the Supreme Court found the origi-
nal indictments and convictions may have, in fact, benefitted the appellees' ability
to defend themselves." The Court's reasoning for such a finding was that the origi-
nal indictments put the appellees on notice of the government's intention to prose-
cute.88 The Court also found the appellees' claim of possible prejudice to their
defense to be "insubstantial, speculative and premature."89 The Court's rationale
in this finding was that the appellees did not mention any specific loss or disap-
pearance of evidence or witnesses." The Court further noted that any delay in
prosecution likewise affects the government's ability to establish their burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the appellees' guilt.91
80. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
81. 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
82. Id. at 120.
83. Id. at 118-19. The appellees were indicted for selling narcotics. Id. at 118 & n.I.; see also 26 U.S.C.
§ 4705(a) (1964). The defendants pled guilty to the charges and were sentenced. Ewell, 383 U.S. at 118. The
Court found the indictments against the defendants to be defective, vacated their convictions, and released them.
Id. The appellees were immediately rearrested and reindicted on new complaints. Id. at 118-19. The appellees'
motions for dismissal alleging denial of their speedy trial rights were granted by the United States District Court
of Indiana. Id. at 119. The district court did, however, reject the appellee's contention that the new charges placed
them in double jeopardy. Id. The government's request for rehearing was denied and appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1964).
84. Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905)).




91. Id. at 122-23.
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The Barker Court incorporated into its fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant,
the interests Ewell determined to be protected by the Sixth Amendment's Speedy
Trial Clause.92 It is likewise noteworthy that the Ewell Court found the defendant's
claim of prejudice wanting for lack of specific evidence of prejudice.93
It was not until 1967 in Klopfer v. North Carolina94 that the Court considered
extending the right to a speedy trial to the several states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.9" The State moved and was granted a nolleprosequi with leave which
temporarily terminated the pending proceedings but enabled the State to reinstate
the prosecution at a future date with the statute of limitations remaining tolled.9"
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina claiming the nolle
prosequi with leave deprived him of his right to a speedy trial." That court held
that the discretion required in entering a nolle prosequi with leave was not review-
able. 98
The United States Supreme Court reversed because the North Carolina crimi-
nal procedure in question denied the defendant the right to a speedy trial which is
"guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States."99 In so holding, the Court noted that while "[t]he petitioner [was] not re-
lieved of the limitations placed upon his liberty[J,] . . . [t]he pendency of the in-
dictment may [have] subject[ed] him to public scorn and deprive[d] him of
employment, and almost certainly [would have] force[d] curtailment of his
speech, associations and participation in unpopular causes.""' The Court then
held, after considering which provisions of the Sixth Amendment applied to the
states through application of the Fourteenth Amendment,0 1 that "the right to a
speedy trial [was] as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment." 0 2
92. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
93. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966).
94. 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
95. Id. at 214.
96. Id. Klopfer, a Professor of Zoology at Duke University, was indicted for the misdemeanor crime of crimi-
nal trespass. Id. at 217-18. While prosecution of the case began promptly, the jury failed to reach a decision. Id.
A mistrial was declared, and the case was ordered continued to the next term. Id. Before the next session, the
court indicated it would approve entry of the State Solicitor's nolle prosequi with leave. Id. See also id. at 215 &
n. 1. However, the State instead filed a motion to continue the case for another term, which was granted. Id. at
217. The case was not listed on the court calendar, and because the pendency of the indictment interfered both
with Klopfer's personal and professional activities, he filed a motion to have the charges against him finally re-
solved. Id. at 218. In response thereto, the State moved and was granted a nolleprosequi with leave. Id. The de-
fendant appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina claiming the nolle prosequi with leave deprived him of
his right to a speedy trial. Id. That court held that the discretion required in entering a nolleprosequi with leave
was not reviewable. Id. at 219.
97. Id. at 218.
98. Id. at 219.
99. Id. at 222.
100. Id. at 221-22.
101. Id. at 222.
102. Id. at 223.
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The Court in Barker employed the determination of the speedy trial right as a
fundamental right to reject the prior analysis of the demand-waiver rule.1"3 The
Barker Court also incorporated into its fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant,
the Klopfer analysis regarding the limitations placed upon the defendant's liberty
prior to trial.104
In 1969, Smith v. Hooey"°5 required the Supreme Court to define the nature and
extent of a state's obligation to guarantee the rights of defendants under the Sixth
Amendment."0 6 The defendant, while incarcerated in the federal penitentiary at
Leavenworth, Kansas, was indicted by a grand jury in Texas on the charge of
theft. 0 7 Shortly after the indictment the defendant sent notice to the Texas trial
court requesting a speedy trial. 0 8 The State of Texas notified the defendant that
trial would begin within two weeks of any date the defendant might specify at
which he could be present.0 9 The United States Supreme Court held that "the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial may not be dispensed with so lightly
... .Upon the petitioner's demand, [the State] had a constitutional duty to make
a diligent, good-faith effort to bring [the defendant] before the court for trial. '"110
The Court reiterated the importance of the three basic interests protected by the
Speedy Trial Clause in United States v. Ewell111 by stating that the "constitutional
guarantee [of the Sixth Amendment] ha[d] universally been thought essential to
protect . . . [the] . . .basic demands of criminal justice in the Anglo-American
legal system," and those demands were aggravated because the accused was incar-
cerated in another jurisdiction.1 2
b. Post-Barker Balancing Test
In 1973, Moore v. Arizona" 3 gave the Court a chance to reevaluate the criteria
established in Barker114 the year before. 1 The Arizona Supreme Court, applying
103. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-30 (1972).
104. Id. at 532-33.
105. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
106. Id. at 375. For six years, petitioner, through letters and motions, continued to request a speedy trial, but
received no better response than that originally received. Id. Petitioner finally filed a motion to dismiss the
charges, again no action was taken by the State. Id. Petitioner brought a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme





110. Id. at 383.
111. 383 U.S. 116, 120(1966).
112. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969).
113. 414 U.S. 25 (1973).
114. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). See also supra notes 34-59 and accompanying text.
115. Moore, 414 U.S. at 25. Moore, while serving a prison sentence in California, was charged with murder in
Arizona. Id. Moore's trial in Arizona began three years after the indictment and 28 months after his demand to be
extradited from California to answer the charge. Id. The defendant filed a state habeas corpus application, alleg-
ing a violation of both his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to speedy trial. Id. The Arizona Supreme
Court, applying Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), ruled that, in the establishment of a speedy trial claim, it
is essential the defendant show prejudice to his defense. Moore, 414 U.S. at 25.
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Barker,11 ruled that in the establishment of a speedy trial claim it is essential that
the defendant show prejudice to his defense.117
In reversing the Arizona Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United
States found Arizona's reading and application of Barker to be fundamentally in
error. 118 The Court reiterated that the factors identified in Barker were not meant
to be analyzed individually, but as part of a balancing process in which the factors
are "considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." '119
Nine years later in United States v. MacDonald,120 the Court examined the
speedy trial right claims of a doctor brought to trial four years after an alleged mur-
der.121 The defendant alleged his right to a speedy trial was violated by the grand
jury indictment on charges dismissed by the Army four years earlier.122
The Supreme Court held once the military charges against MacDonald were
dismissed, he was legally and constitutionally in the same position he would have
been had there been no charges made. 12 The Court stated:
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is thus not primarily intended to pre-
vent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time .... The speedy trial guar-
antee is designed to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to
reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an
accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest
and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. 
124
MacDonald was free to go on with his life without interference, because no crimi-
nal prosecution could be initiated until the grand jury returned with an indict-
ment. 
125
116. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
117. Moore, 414 U.S. at 25.
118. Id. at26.
119. Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
120.456 U.S. 1 (1982).
121. Id. at5.
122. Id. at 4-5. The defendant was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Division [hereinafter CID] of the
Army for the murder of his wife and two daughters and formally charged with those murders on May 1, 1970. Id.
at 4. The charges were dismissed in October, 1970, but, in August, 1974, the Justice Department presented the
case to the grand jury. Id. at 5. After dismissing the charges on October 23, 1970, CID continued its investigation
at the request of the Justice Department, forwarding a 13-volume report to the Justice Department suggesting
further investigation. Id. Additional reports were submitted to the Justice Department in November, 1972, and
August, 1973. Id. The grand jury returned an indictment for all three murders against
MacDonald. Id. MacDonald moved to dismiss the indictment, in part on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial had been violated by the delay in bringing him to trial. Id. The district court denied the
motion, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, granting the interlocutory appeal and holding the delay
between the receipt of the CID report and the convening of the grand jury was a violation of MacDonald's speedy
trial rights. Id. (citing United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976)). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed, holding that before completion of the trial, it is improper for the defendant to appeal the
denial of his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Id. (citing United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850
(1978)). MacDonald was convicted, and on appeal, the Fourth Circuit held the indictment violated MacDonald's
right to a speedy trial and dismissed the indictment. Id. at 6 (citing United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983)).
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id. at 10.
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The Supreme Court reasoned that after the dismissal of the original charges,
any restraint on liberty, disruption of employment, strain on financial resources,
exposure to public disgrace, and stress and anxiety of the defendant was no greater
than it would have been to anyone else under criminal investigation.' 2 6 The de-
fendant did not have criminal charges pending during the period between the mili-
tary arrest and the civilian indictment. 27 "[T]here was no criminal prosecution
pending on which MacDonald could have been tried until the grand jury, in
January 1975, returned the indictment on which he was tried and convicted."128
In 1986, in the case of United States v. Loud Hawk, 29 the Court examined the
effect of dismissal of an indictment on the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
speedy trial.13 Citing MacDonald,131 the Supreme Court held that "[w]hen de-
fendants are not incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their
liberty, a court should not weigh that time towards a claim under the Speedy Trial
Clause." 32 The Court found that "when no indictment is outstanding, only the 'ac-
tual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge. . . en-
gage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth
Amendment.' "133 The Court explained that the "core concern" of the Speedy Trial
126. Id. at9.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 10.
129. 474 U.S. 302 (1986).
130. Id. at 304. In November, 1975, defendants were arrested and indicted for possession of firearms and dy-
namite. Id. at 306. Adhering to their normal policy, the Oregon officers destroyed the confiscated dynamite. Id.
A federal agent at the site photographed the explosions and saved the wrappers from the dynamite. Id. The de-
fendants filed a motion to suppress evidence relating to the dynamite, arguing that the government had intention-
ally and negligently destroyed the dynamite before the defense had a chance to examine it. Id. After initially
denying the motion, the district court granted the motion to suppress. Id. at 306-07. The government requested a
continuance but was denied, resulting in the government not being ready for trial. Id. at 307. The district court
dismissed the indictment with prejudice six months after the original indictment. Id. The government appealed
the dismissal. Id. at 308. The government consolidated this appeal with an earlier appeal of the district court's
granting of the suppression order regarding the dynamite. Id. at 307. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the suppression order and directed the district court to reinstate the dynamite charges. Id. at 308 (citing
United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)). The court also
held that although the government could have gone to trial on the firearms charges, the district court erred in
dismissing those charges with prejudice. Id. at 308. The defendants' appeal for rehearing, and their subsequent
petition for certiorari were denied. Id. at 308 (citing Loud Hawk v. United States, 445 U.S. 917 (1980)). On
March 12, 1980, 46 months later on remand to the district court, the government was ordered to reindict the
defendants. Id. at 308. The defendants were unconditionally released during the entire appeal process. Id. In fact,
the defendants were released on their own recognizance for an additional 29 months while the court of appeals
heard further appeals. Id. at 309. On May 20, 1983, the district court dismissed the indictment on the ground
that the defendants' rights to a speedy trial had been violated. Id. at 310 (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 564
F Supp. 691 (D. Or. 1983)). The court of appeals affirmed the district court, id. (citing United States v. Loud
Hawk, 741 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1984)), and certiorari was granted. Id. (citing United States v. Loud Hawk, 471
U.S. 1014 (1985)).
131. See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
132. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986).
133. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,320 (1971)).
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Clause was the "impairment of liberty; it does not shield a suspect or a defendant
from every expense or inconvenience associated with criminal defense."134
In applying the Barker135 test, the Court examined the fourth factor, prejudice to
the defendant."13 In this case, the possibility of prejudice to the defendant was not
sufficient to show violation of his speedy trial right. 137 The Court further reasoned
that "delay is a two-edged sword," and in a criminal trial the government has the
burden of proof. 138 Thus, passage of time may also affect the government's ability
to satisfy its burden. 
139
In his dissent, Justice Marshall believed that the majority misread Marion in
holding as they did: 140
We held in Marion that prearrest delay is not cognizable under the Speedy Trial
Clause, but we certainly did not disturb the settled rule that the Government's for-
mal institution of criminal charges whether through arrest or indictment, always
calls the speedy trial right into play. . . .Marion nowhere suggested that it is the re-
straints themselves, rather than the assertion of probable cause, that constitute an
accusation.141
In 1989, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Ringstaff v. Howard42 further
analyzed the necessity of the defendant's showing of actual prejudice. The appeals
court believed that "courts should not lightly dispense with the actual prejudice re-
quirement because to do so necessarily results in the 'severe remedy of dismissal of
the indictment.' "" The court believed that the defendant was required to show
actual prejudice when the delay did not result from bad faith or deliberate acts by
the government.'" The court ultimately held that prejudice should not be pre-
sumed unless the other three Barker factors weighed heavily against the govern-
ment. 
145
134. Id. at 312. The Court also held that the delay due to the interlocutory appeals should not weigh in the
defendant's claim of violation of Sixth Amendment rights. Id. In making this finding, the Court employed the four
factor test of Barker to determine whether the defendant's right to speedy trial was infringed upon by the numer-
ous continuances. Id. at 313-16. The Court adopted the Barker test to "determine the extent to which appellate
time consumed in the review of pretrial motions should weigh towards a defendant's speedy trial claim." Id. at
314.
135. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.




140. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
142. 885 F.2d 1542 (11 th Cir. 1989).
143. Id. at 1544-45 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972)).
144. Id. at 1545.
145. Id.
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B. Statutory Considerations
1. Speedy Trial Act of 1974
In 1974, Congress promulgated the Speedy Trial Act146 to provide specific time
limits upon the government for bringing the criminal defendant to trial: "[Tihe
trial of a defendant charged in an. . . indictment. . . shall commence within sev-
enty days from the filing date (and making public) of the. . . indictment, or from
the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which
such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.1 47 These time constraints do
not affect the situation in which the delay is attributed to the government's inability
to secure the arrest of the accused after indictment. To provide a limited escape
hatch from the established time limitations, 14 Congress enacted § 3173 such that
"[n]o provision[s] of [the Speedy Trial Act] shall be interpreted as a bar to
any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by Amendment VI of the
Constitution."149
2. Rule 48(b)
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 48(b) provides for dis-
missal of an indictment against the defendant by the court "[ijf there is unneces-
sary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing an information
against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district court, or if there is
unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial .... " 1 This rule brings to light
the seriousness of a court's finding a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial violated.
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Doggett declared that while a literal read-
ing of the Sixth Amendment would forbid the government from delaying the trial
of an "accused" for any reason, the Court, before making any ruling, must look to
the test established in Barker. "' "Our cases. . . have qualified the literal sweep of
the provision by specifically recognizing the relevance of four separate enquiries
"152
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court which reversed the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals and held that the delay between Doggett's indictment and
arrest violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 15 1 "When the Govern-
ment's negligence thus causes delay six times as long as that generally sufficient to
146. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1988).
148. H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 7419.
149. 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1988).
150. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b).
151. Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (1992). See also supra notes 46-59 and accompanying
text.
152. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2690.
153. Id. at 2694.
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trigger judicial review and when the presumption of prejudice, albeit unspecified,
is neither extenuated . . . nor persuasively rebutted, the defendant is entitled to
relief."" 4
The Court rejected the government's contention that Doggett had failed to make
out a successful claim because there was no precise showing of prejudice due to
the delay in prosecution.15 The government cited United States v. Marion,156
United States v. MacDonald,1 7 and United States v. Loud Hawkl" 8 to establish that
the defendant's interest in fair adjudication was not significantly protected by the
Speedy Trial Clause.159 The majority believed that such an argument was against
precedent.16 ",,[T]he government asks us, in effect, to read part of Barker right out
of the law, and that we will not do."161
The Court then discussed each factor of the Barker criterion.162 The first Barker
factor, whether the pretrial delay was unusually long,163 required a double inquiry.
First, had the accused alleged that the delay between accusation and trial was pre-
sumptively prejudicial?'64 Second, had the defendant showed enough prejudice to
trigger judicial examination of the claim?16 This second question proved quite im-
portant to the Court's ultimate conclusion because of the majority's presumption
that pre-trial prejudice from delay increases over time.166
In analyzing whether sufficient prejudice existed as a result of the government's
delay in bringing Doggett to trial to trigger judicial examination, 167 the govern-
ment, contrary to the record, claimed to have sought Doggett with diligence.
168
The record showed government agents made no serious effort over a six year per-
iod to determine whether Doggett was in fact living abroad.169 The Supreme Court
maintained the trial court's finding of negligence on the government's part in ap-
prehending and prosecuting the defendant. 
170
The government, before the Supreme Court, contradicted the record by claim-
ing that Doggett knew of the indictment against him.171 If this had been true, this
knowledge would have weighed heavily against the defendant in the analysis of the
154. Id. (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 2692.
156. 404 U.S. 307, 320-23 (1971).
157. 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982).
158. 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986).
159. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2690-94.
163. Id. at 2690.
164. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972)).
165. Id. at 2691.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2690.
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third Barker factor,172 whether the defendant asserted his right to speedy trial.17 3
The Supreme Court, however, maintained the lower court's conclusion of fact that
Doggett was without knowledge of the indictment before his arrest, and therefore,
he could not have been expected to assert his right prior to arrest.174
That Doggett failed to make out a successful claim because there was no precise
showing of prejudice due to the delay in prosecution, 175 required consideration of
Barker's fourth factor.' 76 Doggett claimed prejudice due to the possibility of his de-
fense being impaired by the dimming of memories and loss of exculpatory evi-
dence.177 As pointed out by the Court, "there is probably no other kind [of
prejudice] that [Doggett] can claim, since he was subjected neither to pretrial de-
tention nor . .. to awareness of unresolved charges against him."' 7 a In the
Supreme Court's analysis of the fourth factor, the majority examined the role pre-
sumptive prejudice should have played in the lower court.'79 The government
could have avoided Doggett's speedy trial claim if it had used reasonable diligence
in finding him. 8 ' Under the Barker criteria, negligence should be weighed against
the negligent party. '81 It was the opinion of the Court that to warrant granting relief
to the defendant, the negligence, without a specific showing of prejudice, must
have "lasted longer than negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice."182 The
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2690.
174. Id. at 2691.
175. Id. at 2692.
176. Id. at 2690.
177. Id. at 2692. In answering Doggett's claim, the government offered United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
320-23 (1971); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982); and United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S.
302, 312 (1986); to show that the Speedy Trial Clause does not significantly protect the defendant's interest in
fair adjudication. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692. The Court believed such a contention would have required the
Court to ignore part of the Barker test. Id. The cases supported the contention that the accused's Sixth
Amendment right to speedy trial was confined to formal criminal prosecution. Id. That is, the right was not trig-
gered until arrest, indictment, or other official accusation. Once triggered, the inquiry weighed the effect of de-
lay on the accused's defense just as its effect was weighed against the other Barker factors. Id.
The government alternatively claimed that Doggett failed to affirmatively show specifics of prejudice against
his defense. Id. Consideration of what is prejudicial is not limited to what can be specifically shown. Id.
[W]e generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of the
trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify. While such presumptive prejudice
cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barkercriteria. . .it is the part
of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.
Id. at 2693 (citations omitted).
178. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692.
179. Id. at 2693.
180. Id. In general, great weight would be attached to the government's need for time to find witnesses, answer
pretrial motions, and even to track down the defendant if he attempts to flee. Id. (citing United States v. Loud
Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315-17 (1986)). In fact, delay caused by a missing defendant, if reasonable diligence is
maintained by the government in pursuit, is weighted to the side of the government unless the defendant is able to
show specific prejudice to his defense. Id. A bad-faith delay on the part of the government, presumably to gain
some advantage at trial, would be weighed against the government. Id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
531 (1972)). Negligence in bringing the defendant to trial occupies the area between diligence and bad-faith. Id.
Negligence is not to be regarded as tolerable for the mere reason that the accused cannot point to a specific exam-
ple of prejudice. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2694.
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government's failure to prosecute Doggett was clearly a sufficient showing; but for
the government's delay in following up on Doggett's whereabouts, Doggett would
have faced trial six years earlier than he did.
183
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor presented her belief that the court of
appeals properly weighed the Barker factors in favor of the government.184
Doggett did not suffer any anxiety or restriction of his liberty during the delay be-
tween indictment and trial.18 The only harm that the delay could cause was poten-
tial prejudice to the defendant's ability to defend himself, and speculative harm
should not be allowed to become dispositive. 186 Justice O'Connor also noted that
the majority was straying from precedent because the past holdings of the
Supreme Court have required a showing of actual prejudice to defense before
weighing its effect on the defense.187
In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas stated his belief that "the Sixth
Amendment's speedy trial guarantee does not provide independent protection
against either prejudice to an accused's defense or the disruption of his life."' 88 The
dissent stated that the clause was not directed against prejudice due to delay, but
against prejudice to one's liberty due to delay. 88 While lengthy pretrial delay may
have impaired the accused's defense, this was not the type of prejudice the Speedy
Trial Clause was designed to prevent, and thus, the clause should only come into
play when the delay impaired the defendant's liberty.' 0
Justice Thomas' dissent considered it extraordinary that the majority could
have concluded the government had denied the Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial to Doggett despite the fact he never suffered from the harms of "undue
and oppressive incarceration" or "anxiety and concern accompanying public accu-
sation;" nor was he taken into custody by the United States or subject to bail at any
time during the entire eight and one-half year period."8 ' According to the dissent,
the Court could only assume from the facts that Doggett, during the entire time he
was under indictment, was completely unaware of his predicament and, thus, not
suffering any anxiety or humiliation due to the outstanding indictment.' 92
183. Id.
184. Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 2694.
186. Id.
187. Id.
[T]he "possibility of prejudice is not sufficient to support respondents' position that their speedy trial
rights were violated. In this case, moreover, delay is a two edged sword. It is the Government that bears
the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or
impossible for the government to carry this burden."
Id. (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 315 (1986)).
188. Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 2695.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971)).
192. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
On February 22, 1980, the grand jury's indictment of Doggett on federal drug
charges formally accused him of a crime."' Because of this formal charge, the
courts recognized Doggett as an "accused." '194 The delay in bringing Mr. Doggett
to trial after indictment was "post-accusatory delay" and analyzed with regard to
the protections of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution.19 The Court found
the post-accusatory delay violated Mr. Doggett's Sixth Amendment rights to a
speedy trial, giving the Court no choice but to dismiss the indictment and release
him without further recourse.
In Barker the Court stated:
The amorphous quality of the right [to speedy trial] leads to the unsatisfactorily se-
vere remedy of dismissal of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is
indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of
a serious crime will gofree .... Such a remedy is more serious than an exclusion-
ary rule or a reversal for new trial, but it is the only possible remedy.
196
These words of Justice Powell should always be in the minds of the court and at the
heart of any analysis alleging violation of a defendant's speedy trial rights. This
cannot be said with respect to Mr. Doggett's claim.
Mr. Doggett is indeed a sympathetic defendant. An eight and one-half year de-
lay between indictment and trial is, on its face, extreme. The majority seems to
believe that even though Mr. Doggett was indicted for conspiracy, to import and
distribute cocaine in the United States in violation of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act,197 his incarceration in Panama on drug related
charges199 coupled with his subsequent change of lifestyle-college, marriage, and
gainful employment199 - show sufficient rehabilitation on the defendant's part. The
Court's holding is result-oriented and potentially harms the integrity of the Barker
balancing test as a means of determining a violation of one's right to a speedy trial.
Courts must assess and weigh four factors in determining whether a defendant's
right to a speedy trial has been violated: length of delay, reason for delay, defend-
ant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.2"' The first factor,
"length of delay," is considered the trigger for this test.2"1 There should be no ex-
amination into any of the other factors, and no determination of a speedy trial vio-
lation, unless a delay in prosecution is found to be "presumptively prejudicial."20 2
193. Id. at 2689; see Marion, 404 U.S. at 313.
194. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313.
195. Id.
196. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) (emphasis added).
197. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, ch. 13, 84 Stat. 1265, 1291 (1970) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 963 (1993)); Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2689.
198. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2689.
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 46-59 and accompanying text.
201. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
202. Id.
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The trial court in the present case found, and the government conceded, the delay
in bringing Mr. Doggett to trial was "presumptively prejudicial" and proceeded to
analyze the other Barker criteria to determine whether there had been a violation
of the defendant's right to a speedy trial.23
In the Supreme Court's analysis of Mr. Doggett's claim, however, "presumptive
prejudice" was not the starting point of the analysis, it was the entire analysis.2"4
The "presumptive prejudice" element employed by the majority was not the same
as that originally defined in Barker.2"5 This new "presumptive prejudice" factor
was an all encompassing element for disposing of the defendant's speedy trial
claim. The Court did not concern itself with assessing and weighing the four
Barker factors to determine whether Doggett's speedy trial right had been vio-
lated, but rather found fault for the delay and penalized the offending party.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court found that while Doggett failed to make an
affirmative showing of prejudice to his defense,
excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that nei-
ther party can prove or ... identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone
carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria,. . . it is
part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of de-
lay.2
06
It is here that the Court changed the role of "presumptive prejudice" in the Barker
test. "Presumptive prejudice" had been associated with excessive delay, the trigger
of the Barker test. Now the Court associates "presumptive prejudice" with the
fourth factor, as the prejudice against the defense that the defendant is unable to
prove because of the delay. Instead of employing "presumptive prejudice" as a
means for opening the door to Barker, the Court has manipulated it so as to close
the door on the fourth factor. In effect, the Court eliminated the defendant's re-
quired showing of prejudice to his defense because the delay was excessive and
therefore, "presumptively prejudicial." Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted that
speculative harm has heretofore not been allowed to tip the scales.207 Instead, a
showing of actual prejudice has been required before weighing in the balance.208
As a means of avoiding the balancing of the Barker factors, the Court sought to
determine the role of "presumptive prejudice" in the disposition of Mr. Doggett's
claim. The analysis of "presumptive prejudice" focused solely on the negligence of
the government in bringing Mr. Doggett to trial. The government's negligence was
said to occupy a middle ground between diligent prosecution and bad-faith de-
lay. 2" The Court reasoned that just as bad-faith does not compel relief in every
203. United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573, 578 (1 th Cir. 1990).
204. Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693-94 (1992).
205. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
206. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692-93 (citation omitted).
207. Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2694 (1992) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208. Id. Cf supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text; see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973).
209. Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693.
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instance, neither does negligence become "automatically tolerable simply because
the accused cannot demonstrate exactly how it has prejudiced him."2 ' Continuing
in its avoidance of Barker's balancing procedure, the majority states that it "is the
nature of the prejudice presumed that the weight we assign to official negligence
compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows."211 it
should be noted that the Court made this statement without citation to precedent
or any other authority, and the opinion was devoid of guidelines for future courts
to follow to determine what length of delay nullifies Barker's fourth factor showing
of prejudice to the defense.
While reaffirming its position that deliberate delay on the part of the govern-
ment would be heavily weighed against them,2"2 the Court announced that its tol-
eration of the government's negligent delay in bringing the criminal defendant to
trial decreases as the negligence extends over time.2"3 The majority sought only to
find the party responsible for the delay in prosecution and, once found, rule
against the offender. The decision shows the majority becoming more vigilant
against governmental negligence and attempting to deter future official negligence
from causing long delays in bringing accused defendants to trial. This is a noble
idea, but it was never part of the balancing test established by Barker.
Barker is a balancing test. As provided in Barker, none of the four identified
factors is necessary or sufficient to find a violation of the defendant's rights; the
courts must still engage in a balancing process.2"4 In the present case, the majority
did not engage in that process. In the Court's new view of the Barker analysis, ex-
cessive delay, while still raising "presumptive prejudice" against the government,
also presumes that there is some prejudice to defense, affected by the length of de-
lay, that the defendant cannot possibly prove. By effectively eliminating the show-
ing of prejudice to the defense, the Court has allowed negligence resulting in
excessive delay to become the dispositive factor. Negligence in bringing a defend-




213. Id. at 2693-94.
214. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
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balancing test.215 Negligence should be considered in the analysis of the second
factor, reason for delay, and then balanced against the remaining factors, not
alone.216 Thus, the Supreme Court in Doggett has merely paid lip-service to an im-
portant balancing test designed to protect, not only the constitutional rights of the,
criminal defendant, but society as a whole. By burdening the government with dis-
proving a new presumption of prejudice to the defense due to delay, the Court may
enable more criminal defendants to go free and return to society, regardless of their
guilt.
The Court seemingly ignored Justice Powell's warning in Barker217 of the se-
vere nature of the remedy at bar. The Court is setting free a man, who admitted to
being part of a conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine, because of negligence
on the part of the government in securing his arrest and capture. Mr. Doggett was
not required to show any prejudice to his defense caused by the government's neg-
ligent delay in capturing him. The Supreme Court simply presumed such prejudice
existed. Barker was not established for courts to look at one or two factors and pre-
sume others; its purpose is to weigh and balance those certain factors to determine
whether a violation of the defendant's right to speedy trial has occurred. If such a
violation is discovered, then the court has no choice but to dismiss the indictment
and release the defendant. It is in light of this severe remedy that the examination
of Mr. Doggett's claim should have been analyzed under the Barker balancing test.
To observe a proper application of the Barker analysis, the Supreme Court
needed to look no further than the lower court. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit applied the Barker factors to the case of Ringstaff v. Howard."'8
According to Ringstaff, "[tihe defendant does not have to show actual prejudice
...if the first three factors weigh heavily against the government. ""' It was the
215. Id. at 531 ("A more neutral reason such as negligence. . . should be weighted less heavily but neverthe-
less should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government
. . . ."); see also United States v. Benson, 846 F.2d 1338, 1342 (t1 th Cir. 1988) ("[Bly the government's own
admission, at least half of the delay was caused by pure negligence. Thus, we must determine whether a negligent
delay causing minor prejudice to the appellant's defense violates the appellant's due process rights."); United
States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11 th Cir. 1986) ("The best that can be said is that if the government was at
fault for not locating Bagga in India, it was clearly no more than mere negligence. . .[which] does not necessar-
ly tip the scale in favor of the defendant, particularly where the defendant was at liberty and outside the jurisdic-
tion where the indictment was returned." (citations omitted)); Payne v. Rees, 738 F.2d 118, 123 (6th Cir. 1984)
("There was no deliberate effort by the prosecution in this case to delay the trial, rather there was a negligent
failure to proceed. Under all of these circumstances, . . . there was no proven speedy trial violation, taking into
account all the Barkerfactors despite the extraordinary delay here involved."); Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 382-
83 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Delay caused by negligence should be weighed against the state, but less heavily than a delib-
erate attempt to delay trial. . . .The failure of the government to expedite a case which has been pending for a
presumptively prejudicial period of time is treated in a similar fashion." (citations omitted)); United States v.
Carter, 603 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Though a purposeful attempt to delay the trial to prejudice the
defendant . . . should weigh heavily against the Government . . .a more neutral reason, such as negligence,
does not necessarily tip the scale in favor of the defendant, particularly where the defendant was at liberty and
outside the jurisdiction where the indictment was returned.").
216. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973).
217. Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
218. 885 F.2d 1542 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
219. Id. at 1543. (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 769 F.2d 1544, 1547 (1 1th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1066 (1986)).
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holding of the Eleventh Circuit, however, that since, the length of delay was the
only factor that weighed heavily against the government, an inquiry into the preju-
dice suffered by the defendant was mandated.22 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit
properly found Doggett's claim of a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation to be
without merit.22' While this decision is harsh, in view of Doggett's change of life-
style, it is the only decision that could have been made under the Barker balancing
test. Thus, when Doggett was unable to show prejudice to his defense, and the
other Barker factors did not weigh heavily against the government, the Supreme
Court was bound to follow its established test and uphold the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Doggett, the Supreme Court turned its back on a test it had employed for
twenty years. Unfortunately, the Court also turned a deaf ear to Justice Powell's
warning of twenty years ago: "This is indeed a serious consequence because it
means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free. .. 222
Regardless of sympathy for the defendant or vexation for the government's negli-
gence, it was imperative that the Barker test remain intact. Unfortunately, that did
not occur. The Court allowed its disapproval of the government's negligent han-
dling of the Doggett affair, albeit excessive, to color its judgment. In doing so, the
Court circumvented Barker and simply sought the reason for the delay in prosecu-
tion and ruled against the party at fault. While this may teach the government a
lesson, the Court was required to set free a confessed drug dealer.
Doggett has sent the wrong message. The courts must return to Barker and
again assess and weigh its probative factors. Presuming certain factors to exist, as
the Court did in Doggett, is not satisfactory. Doggett has put the onus on the gov-
ernment to disprove a new presumption of prejudice against the defendant be-
cause, the Court believes, some prejudice cannot be proved.223 If the government
is unable to overcome this presumption, then the courts will have no choice but to
dismiss the indictment and set the accused free, regardless of guilt.
220. United States v. Doggett, 906 F.2d 573, 580 (1 Ith Cir. 1990).
221. Id. at 582.
222. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
223. Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2692-93 (1992).
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